Irving Fisher: origins of modern central bank policy by Robert L. Formaini
Insights Economic
Smith, David Ricardo and J. S. Mill—
but ventured into neoclassical mathe-
matical economics, becoming one of its
pioneers. Modern economics was going
through tremendous changes during
Fisher’s college years, and he helped
lead it in the direction that produced its
current reliance on mathematics, gen-
eral equilibrium analysis and aggregate
data sets for the calculation of various
price indexes. In this transformative
undertaking, he should be ranked along
with Leon Walras, Stanley Jevons and
Francis Edgeworth.
After returning from a trip to
Europe in 1895, Fisher became an assis-
tant professor of political and social sci-
ence at Yale (over the fierce objections
of the mathematics faculty, which
wanted Fisher for itself). He started
Irving Fisher was one of America’s
most celebrated economists. Although
not widely remembered outside of eco-
nomics, within it he has increasingly
become considered a giant of the pro-
fession. 
Fisher was born in 1867 in
Saugerties, New York, and died in New
York City in 1947. He studied at Yale
University, where he was taught by
such prominent academics as William
Graham Sumner, Josiah Willard Gibbs
and Arthur Twining Hadley. Sumner
was the professor who convinced
Fisher to write his doctoral dissertation
on mathematical economics, a field then
in its infancy.
Fisher received a B.A. in mathe-
matics in 1888, followed by a Ph.D. in
economics in 1891. Although he won
every math prize contest he entered
and the Yale math faculty wanted him
to major in mathematics as a graduate
student, during his senior year he
became interested in other subjects,
including law, metaphysics and social
and political science.
His earliest economics research
culminated in his internationally ac-
claimed dissertation, Mathematical In-
vestigations in the Theory of Value and
Prices (1892). Fisher wrote this work
under the direction of the mathematics
faculty because formal economics doc-
torates typically were not offered in
U.S. universities at that time. In fact,
Fisher wrote Yale’s first.
Fisher had been well schooled in
the political economy of the day—pri-
marily the British tradition of Adam
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Origins of Modern Central Bank Policy
During the first quarter of the 20th
century, Irving Fisher was one of
America’s most celebrated economists.
But sadly, most Americans today have not
heard of him. Even as his reputation
among the public faded with the years, his
reputation within the economics profes-
sion has steadily risen. Fisher (no relation
to the undersigned, though I would like to
claim access to his gene pool) was a pio-
neer in many theoretical and technical
areas of economics that today are the
foundation of central bank policy. One
such achievement was the creation of
indexes to measure average prices, the
bedrock for all current monetary policy.
His was a storied and successful career
even if, by the time of his death, Fisher’s
own finances and reputation as an eco-
nomic prognosticator lay in ruins. We
hope readers will find his life story inter-
esting as they learn more about this pio-
neer of monetary economics.
— Richard W. Fisher
President

















































             Before a price index can be stabi-
lized as a matter of monetary policy, it
must be defined and calculated. Fisher
was one of the world’s first experts on
the calculation of index numbers. He
began the first weekly newspaper pub-
lication of a wholesale price index in
1923.
In addition to helping originate the
idea of commodity money stabilization,
Fisher’s expertise ranged from the gen-
eral equilibrium theorizing of his dis-
sertation to the emerging study of eco-
nometrics. He was a cofounder of the
American Econometrics Society (1931)
and was its first president (1932). He
even published definitive works in ac-
counting theory and practice. His theo-
retical work touches on almost every
major macroeconomic issue and is still
regularly consulted and cited, not only
by historians of economic thought, but
also by practicing economists. That, in
itself, sets him apart from most of his
contemporaries. 
A key area of interest for Fisher
was the quantity theory of money, and
his work was a forerunner of what
macroeconomists today call mone-
tarism.
1 Fisher attempted to take the
ics, one of his most notable contribu-
tions was his work on the doctrine of
dollar stability. He had always been
interested in the issue but did not put
his ideas into book form until 1911
with the publication of The Purchasing
Power of Money. The policy of price
stabilization, carried out today by cen-
tral banks all over the world, is mostly
based on work done by Fisher
between 1895 and 1922, when his The
Making of Index Numbers was first
published.
teaching economics, rapidly rising to
the position of full professor in 1898.
He retired from Yale in 1935.
After his dissertation, more than a
decade passed before Fisher published
another important book on economics.
Because of personal health concerns
during this period, he became fasci-
nated with health-related issues, ex-
plored various exercise and relaxation
techniques, wrote books about both
and became almost a pure vegetarian. 
When Fisher returned to econom-
In his book 100% Money, Fisher begins by setting himself the following small task:
Designed to keep checking banks 100% liquid; to prevent inflation and deflation; 
largely to cure or prevent depressions; and to wipe out much of the National Debt.
In this book, produced during the middle of the Great Depression, Fisher endorsed the so-
called Chicago Plan put forward by leading economists at the University of Chicago. The plan
included 100 percent bank reserves, and Fisher endorsed it because he believed the system in
place before 1935 had been far too unstable. He writes here about the 1920s but could just as well
be predicting the late 1990s:
The over-indebtedness hitherto presupposed must have had its starters. Over-indebted-
ness may be started by many causes, of which the most common appears to be new
opportunities to invest at a big prospective profit, as compared with ordinary profits and
interest. Such new opportunities occur through new inventions, new industries, develop-
ment of new resources, opening of new lands or new markets. When the rate of profit is
expected to be far greater than the rate of interest, we have the chief cause of over-bor-
rowing. When an investor thinks he can make over 100 per cent per annum by borrowing
at 6 per cent, he will be tempted to borrow, and to invest or speculate with borrowed
money. This was a prime cause leading to the over-indebtedness of 1929. Inventions and
technological improvements created wonderful investment opportunities, and so caused
big debts....
When the starter consists of new opportunities to make unusually profitable investments,
the bubble of debt, especially bank loans, tends to be blown bigger and faster than when
the starter is some great misfortune, like an earthquake causing merely non-productive
debts....
The public psychology of going into debt for gain passes through at least four more or less
distinct phases: (a) the lure of big prospective profits in the form of dividends, i.e. income
in the future; (b) the hope of selling at a profit, and realizing a capital gain in the immedi-
ate future; (c) the vogue of reckless promotions, taking advantage of the habituation of the
public to great expectations; (d) the development of downright fraud, imposing on a pub-
lic which had grown credulous and gullible. 
When it is too late, the dupes discover scandals like the Hatry and Kreuger scandals. At
least one book has been written to prove that crises are due to frauds of clever promoters.
But these frauds could seldom, if ever, have become so great without the original starters
of genuine opportunities to invest lucratively. There is probably always a very real basis for
the “new era” psychology before it runs away with its victims. n
—100% Money, 130–32 (original emphasis)
A Modest Agenda
Our fixed-weight dollar is as poor a
substitute for a really stable dollar as
would be a fixed weight of copper, a fixed
yardage of carpet, or a fixed number of
eggs. If we were to define a dollar as a
dozen eggs, thenceforth the price of eggs
would necessarily and always be a dollar a
dozen. Nevertheless, the supply and
demand of eggs would keep on working.
For instance, if the hens failed to lay, the
price of eggs would not rise but the price
of almost everything else would fall. One
egg would buy more than before. Yet,
because of Money Illusion, we would not
ever suspect the hens of causing low
prices and hard times. In what sense,
then, should a dollar be fixed if not in
weight. Evidently, in buying power. n
— The Money Illusion, 17
Is Gold Stable?
                   to do so. When he was finally broke,
Yale University had to buy his house
and rent it back to him to keep him
from being evicted. His sunny predic-
tions of a “new era” with continuing
prosperity, even after the 1929 crash,
lowered his reputation among econo-
mists as well as the general public.
Despite falling from the rank of
America’s best-known economist into
obscurity for several decades, Fisher’s
reputation has since risen steadily as
economists rediscover the path-break-
ing work he did on so many important
topics. Fisher wrote 29 books, 14 of
which are about economics. Joseph
Schumpeter’s 1948 memorial article
sums up well Fisher’s many contribu-
tions and his long-term place in the his-
tory of economics:
In his scientific work, he stood
almost alone.... There are no
Fisherians in the sense in which
classical school’s equation of exchange
(MV = PT), which is simply a mathe-
matical truism, and convert this equa-
tion into a general theory of prices and,
therefore, of the price level. He did this
by allowing for transition periods when
the flow of the money supply is
changed (thus breaking the equality of
the equation during the transition
period).
He laid out his ideas thoroughly in
The Purchasing Power of Money. The
book is also a long plea for Fisher’s
views about how a commodity money
(in this case, gold) can be stabilized in
international trade situations. He antic-
ipated much of what today we call
“monetary rules.” His approach was to
make the U.S. dollar one of constant
purchasing power and not one of a
constant amount (weight) of gold or
anything else.
The idea he promoted in his book,
and continued to advocate for the rest
of his life, came to be called the com-
pensated dollar. He argued for altering
the commodity price of gold inversely
with movements in a designated price
index to stabilize its real purchasing
power. He also anticipated—by over
40 years—A. W. Phillips’ famous curve
with its trade-off between inflation and
unemployment.
In addition to his other endeavors,
Fisher was an inventor and entrepre-
neur. He created and patented an index
card file system (known today as the
Rolodex) that led him to start the Index
Visible Company, which merged with
Kardex Rand in 1925 and later became
Remington Rand. The company made
Fisher very wealthy. Yet for all his
knowledge of economic theory and
markets, Fisher suffered huge declines
in his personal fortune and his profes-
sional reputation in the 1929 stock mar-
ket crash and the Great Depression,
eventually leaving an estate so small it
wasn’t even taxed.
His son estimated his monetary los-
ses in this period to have been as much
as $10 million. He continued buying
stock well past the time it was prudent
As to the idea that the government should make the gold standard “automatic” and unas-
sisted by any legislative action, even if that implies (as it certainly does) unstable money, the reply
is that there is no function of government more obviously proper than to keep stable the units by
which we measure. We have a Bureau of Standards which fixes the units of length, weight, vol-
ume, electricity, and of every other unit employed in commerce, except the most important and
universally used unit of all, the unit of value. Our Federal Constitution authorizes Congress to “coin
money and regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and
measures.”
There is a popular fiction that our price level and gold standard ought to be left to the “nat-
ural” play of supply and demand and not subjected to “arbitrary” interference. Of course every unit
of measure is “arbitrary.” There is no “natural” yard. The gold dollar is already “arbitrary” at 23.22
grains. In fact it is unnaturally arbitrary to fix it in weight; for this interferes with the play of sup-
ply and demand on the price of gold. This price, on the plea of “naturalness,” certainly ought to
be as free to fluctuate as the price of silver, instead of being tied to the fixed figure $20.67 per
ounce. 
The idea that the gold standard today is, or can be, “automatic” is wrong. As we have seen,
gold is now far more influenced by banking policy than by its use in the arts for dentistry, gilding
picture frames or making gold watches, rings and jewelry. Such use is trivial in comparison with
its importance in finance. As Reginald McKenna [1863–1943, British politician and banker, chan-
cellor of the exchequer, 1915–16] has said, the world now has a “dollar standard” fixed by credit
control rather than a gold standard fixed by gold bullion as such.... We already have human dis-
cretion, operating if not to control, at least to influence, the price level; we no longer have an auto-
matic gold standard. And we ought to be profoundly thankful!
Only by the exercise of discretion, duly safeguarded, can we really expect some day fully to
stabilize the dollar. n
—The Money Illusion, 156–58 (original emphasis)
Ought the Gold Standard Be “Automatic”?
Such a collection (capital machines)
of wealth is, however, heterogeneous; it
cannot be expressed in a single sum. We
can inventory the separate items, but we
cannot add them together. They may, how-
ever, be reduced to a homogeneous mass
by considering, not their kinds and quanti-
ties, but their values. And this value of any
stock of wealth is also called “capital.” To
distinguish these two senses of capital, we
call a stock, store or accumulation of
existing instruments of wealth, each in-
strument being measured in its own unit,
capital-instruments, or capital-wealth, and
we call the value of this stock, when all
articles are measured in a common unit,
capital-value. n
— The Nature of Capital and Income, 
66 (original emphasis)
Can Capital Be Measured?
                             Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1969), “Irving Fisher,”
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there have been Ricardians or
Marshallians and in which there
are Keynesians.... But those pillars
and arches [of Fisher’s theoretical
temple] will stand by themselves.
They will be visible long after the
sands will have smothered much
that commands the scene of
today.
2 n
— Robert L. Formaini
Senior Economist
Notes
1 For accounts of this theory by other famous
economists, see “Knut Wicksell: The Birth of
Modern Monetary Policy,” by Robert L.
Formaini, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Economic Insights, vol. 9, no. 1, and “Milton
Friedman: Economist as Public Intellectual,”
by Robert L. Formaini, Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas Economic Insights, vol. 7, no. 2.
2 Schumpeter (1969), 237–38.
Sources and Suggested Reading
Blaug, Mark (1986), Great Economists Before
Keynes (New York: Cambridge University
Press).
Fisher, I. N. (1956), My Father, Irving Fisher
(New York: Comet Press Books). 
Fisher, Irving (1906), The Nature of Capital and
Income (New York: MacMillan).
——— (1928), The Money Illusion (New York:
Adelphi Company).
——— (1936), 100% Money (New York:
Adelphi Company).
——— (1965), The Theory of Interest (New
York: Augustus M. Kelley), orig. pub. 1930.
Humphrey, Thomas (1997), “Fisher and
Wicksell on the Quantity Theory,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond Quarterly Review,
83 (Fall).
Laidler, David (1991), The Golden Age of the
Quantity Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press).
Economic Insights is a publication of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views 
expressed are those of the authors and should 
not be attributed to the Federal Reserve System.
Please address all correspondence to
Economic Insights
Public Affairs Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
P.O. Box 655906
Dallas, TX  75265-5906
Visit our web site at www.dallasfed.org.
As a social reformer, Irving Fisher was a failure. He opposed the federal income tax, but the
16th Amendment created one. He was in favor of the Prohibition Amendment, but that was even-
tually repealed. He passionately advocated monetary and tax policies that were never adopted. His
association with “healthy food” companies wound up with him attaching his name to such prod-
ucts as sugar-coated breakfast cereals made by Post and Kellogg. With President Woodrow
Wilson, he strongly supported creation of a League of Nations after World War I.
Retrospectively, perhaps the worst endeavor he supported was the American eugenics move-
ment, serving as president of its national association from 1922 to 1926. Like other notables who
grew up during the Progressive Era, Fisher became convinced that a scientific approach to pro-
ducing better human beings was not just possible, but desirable. History has judged this under-
taking in a negative light. But these ideas were popular at the time, considered by many to be cut-
ting edge science. Many major news organizations in the United States were enthusiastic
supporters, even editorializing in support of infanticide as a legitimate means of carrying out the
eugenics program. In the late 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court in a famous opinion authored by
Oliver Wendell Holmes legally endorsed forced sterilization as another weapon to be used against
the “genetically undesirable.”
But in spite of all this, Fisher’s immersion in social reforms of large scope is curious given
his own youthful insights on this very subject. In a letter to a Yale colleague in 1895, Fisher
demonstrated great wisdom on the topic of large reform movements and social reformers gener-
ally:
Concerning social reform, I feel that the effort of philanthropists to apply therapeutics too
soon is more likely to lead to evil than good. The very best the exhorter can do is to work
against the “something must be done” spirit, and beg us to wait patiently until we know
enough to base action upon and meantime confine philanthropic endeavor to the narrow 
limits in which it has been proved successful—chiefly education.... There is so much 
specific reform at hand to be done—in city government, suppression of vice, education—
that the hard workers of humanity need not and ought not talk, until “little” things are done, 
on broad schemes for “society.”
—My Father, Irving Fisher, 71 (original emphasis)
Later in his life, Fisher clearly did not take the thoughtful advice that he dispensed to others
when younger. n
A Great Economist—but a Failure as a Social Reformer
 